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“ [Government agencies are] invested with awesome powers 
of compulsion - to tax, regulate, inspect, arrest - and attractive 
powers of reward - to subsidize, purchase, and protec t. 
Typically they exercise these powers as monopolists , 
immune from competition. To make them accountable, we 
enshroud them in a maze of laws, regulations, and court 
rulings; to keep them responsive, we expose them to access 
by endless reporters, lawyers, committees, and investigators. 
The result, inevitably, is a culture of risk aversion that 
cannot readily be altered" James Q. Wilson (1994: 672). 
INTRODUCTION 
The panacea for the public sector's self-evidently inadequate 
performance is seen by many as the need for civil servants to pursue a 
results-oriented approach to their management using private sector 
management principles and practices. This managerialist view now 
pervades public administration in, most notably, Australia, New Zealand, 
the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States) (Caiden, 1994; Dixon, 
1988 & 1995; Dixon & Kouzmin, 1994, Kouzmin, Dixon & Wilson, 1995. 
Hede, 1991; Ingraham & Peters, 1988; Lane, 1985; Mascarenhas, 1993; Peters, 
1994; Pollitt, 1990) and, embrionicly, in Hong Kong (Hong Kong 
Government, 1995). The purpose of this paper is to explore the meaning of 
managerialism and its raison d' etre, and to identify the challenges and 
threats that must be confronted before its promise of improved public agency 
performance can become a reality. 
扎1ANAGERIALISM:
THE PRIV A TE SECTOR SOLUTION TO THE PUBLIC SECTOR PROBLEM 
The neo-conservative ideology of neo-classical welfare economics 
under-scores the linking of the public agency efficiency to managerial ability, 
authority and accountability by the the adoption of managerialist (business-
like) principles and practices (such as strategic planning and management, 
customer service, quality assurance, performance management, risk 
management and even accrual accounting) (Golembiewski & Kuhnert, 1994; 
Hensher 1986), creating what Adams and Ingersoll (1990: 285) describe as 
"the managerial metamyth". 
Neo-classical welfare economics has acquired the classical Benthamite 
distaste for the public sector (Bentham [1789] 1970), which is constant1y 
under suspicion of being inefficient, wasteful, and thus not giving value for 
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money, because the absence of any automatic disciplining mechanism 
permits rent-seeking behaviour (Tullock & Eller, 1994) by bureaucrats, their 
clients and the politicians who govern them, perhaps even with 
Machiavallian f1air (Gilman et a1., 1993; Terrell, 1993). The neo-institutiona1 
economist's concern is about "opportunism" in public administration (that 
is, self-serving (rent-seeking), even deceitfu1 and dishonest, behaviour by 
bureaucrats, their clients and politicians) created either because 
environmenta1 uncertainty makes contracts incomp1ete, or because 
"principa1s" cannot effective1y monitor the behaviour of their "agents", who 
do not have identica1 interests and who have information that is not 
accessib1e to to them. Under the influence of this ideo10gy, public agencies 
are conceptualised as amorphous, instrumenta1, rationa1-1ega1 form of 
hierarchica1 organisations administered by rationally self-interested officia1s, 
who, according to Tullock (1965: 29-30) can be normally treated ". . . as if 
[they] were behaving out of selfish motivation". These officia1s, akin to the 
archetypa1 traditiona1 bureaucrats (Gregory, 1991: 307-8), are inherent uti1ity 
maximisers motivated by the desire to maximise their own utility functions 
that are c1ear1y self-serving (by embracing power, income, perks, public 
reputation, prestige, patronage, ease of making change, ease of management, 
convenience and security), although not exc1usive1y so (by allowing for 
organisationa1 10yalty, mission commitment, professiona1 pride and serving 
the public interest, and agency output) (Downs, 1967: Niskanen 1973). The 
result is the inherent tendencies for such bureaucrats to be deceitfu1, or even 
dishonest, by distorting information communicated upward, so as to 
promote their own self-interest; by making decisions that are consistent with 
their own self-interest; and by imp1ementing policy decisions in such a way 
as to promote their own self-interest (Downs, 1967: 77-78), which u1timate1y 
means maximising the size of their agencies (Tullock, 1976: 26-35) in terms 
of personne1 (Noll & Fiorina, 1979), budgets (Niskanen 1973: 22-23; a1so 1994; 
but see Conybeare, 1984) or discretionary budgets (defined as the difference 
between the budget received and the minimum cost of producing the 
required outputs) (Niskanen, 1975). This creates a bureaucracy that is 
perpetua1 
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1975). Bureaucratic failure is thus inevitable; the bureaucratic solution to 
which, according to Perlman (1976: 76), is usually: 
. . . to create another bureau to oversee those who have lapsed into 
sin. Bureaux are piled on bureau and the bureacracy grows on. 
This process of ever expanding vertical and structural control is a response 
to the need for a governance mechanism that minimises the cost of any 
mismatch between controls and tasks by making bureaucracies responsible 
for the tasks they perform. A situation is thus created where monitoring 
bureaux become increasingly involved with the minutiae of administration 
and thus have a growing demand for control-oriented information, hence 
Downs' observation that (1967: 150): 
The quantity and detail of reporting required by monitoring 
bureaus tends to rise steadily over time, regardless of the amount 
or nature of the activity being monitored. 
In the face of bureaucratic failure, Weimer and Vining (1991: 132) observe 
that the "principals" (the politicians who govern) face : 
. . the task of creating organisational arrangements [incentives, 
sanctions and monitoring] that minimise the sum of the costs of 
the undesirable behaviour of agents and of the activity 
undertaken to control it 
Managerialism 
Uhr (1990: 22) defines managerialism as: 
The pursuit of results-oriented systems of government 
management through streamlined processes of decision-making 
designed to allow greater autonomy but also greater responsibility 
for the field or program manager. 
Managerialism: 
• places emphasis on policy management and implementation 
rather than on policy development and design in public 
administration; 
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• stresses efficiency, effectiveness and quality, as against 
process and equity, in the management of public resources 
(involving goal setting, performance benchmaking, 
performance definition, performance measurement, 
performance feedback and performance enhancement 
incentives); 
• advocates the use private sector management practices in the 
public sector; 
• seeks to diffuse responsibility and to devolve authority, with 
the establishment of corresponding management 
responsibility and public accountability structures; 
-. shifts the public accountability focus from inputs and process 
to outputs and outcomes; and 
• prefers to create, where ever possible, a competitive public 
administration (Halachmi & Holzer, 1993), especially for 
those public agencies responsible for delivering government 
services (see also Rehfuss, 1991). 
MANAGERIALISM AS "GOOD PUBLIC ADMINISTRA TION" 
Managerialism fosters the proposition that "good government and 
good organisation results from deliberate intentions, detailed plans and 
consistent decisions" (Prasser 1990: 194). The politico-adminis廿ative task of 
government is conceptualised by managerialists as responding as efficient1y 
and as effectively as possible to the claims made by its various 
constituencies, using a rational-comprehensive model of policy-making, 
involving de-politicised , goal-oriented strategies , chosen after 
comprehensive instrumental-rational (means-ends mode) analysis, and 
routinely implemented by compliant, decentralised yet hierarchically-
controlled and accountable public agencies. Such public agencies are viewed 
systemically as problem-solving and program-delivery mechanisms , 
conceptualised as production units (open systems) within which measurable 
"inputs" are used in a "production process" (generating "activities勻 to
produce measurable "outputs" that have an "impact" (produce "costs" and 
市enefits") and thus generate measurable objective-related "outcomes" that 
measure given and known "organisational objectives" that are compatible 
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with given and known "government policy objectives" (Breton, 1974). The 
management of the public "production process" is thus best de-coupled, as 
far as possible, from political structures and processes and best left not to self-
seeking and empire-building bureaucrats (Kaufman, 1981), but to cognitive, 
goal-oriented, problem-solving, decision-making and interventionist 
technocrats (Flam, 1990: 225): 
• who would always prefer to use information as an aid to 
joint problem solving, rather than distorting it to promote 
their own narrow self-interest, such as Kobrak's (1992) 
“organisational gangsterism" (behaviour by individuals that 
accelerates their personal career growth while 
simultaneously undermining organisational goals), or use it 
as a resource in an intra- or inter-organisational strqggle (as 
described by 叭Tilensky (1967); 
• who would use advanced analytical techniques, to determine 
which programs wiU (and do) best achieve their desired 
objectives, rather than judging merely on the basis of self-
interest; and 
• who would adopt private sector business practices to create 
the appropriate structures, processes, culture and incentives 
to deliver those programs most efficiently and more 
economically, operating within a outcome-centred budgetary 
and public accountability systems, rather than adopting 
administrative practices aimed at maximising their span of 
control, their overall subordinate personnel or their budgets. 
In this setting, publicly-provided services would be delivered with more 
"productive efficiency" (by increasing productivity) and with more 
"exchange efficiency" (by maximising the utility derived from those services 
by supplying 0叫y citizens who derive the highest utility from them (that is, 
have the greatest need for them), which is achieved by altering consumer 
behaviour through education, regulation and economic incentives) . This 
would make government programs and, indeed, government, both more 
11 cost-efficient" and "cost-effective" in the use of resources, w hich would 
maximise community satisfaction (Simon, 1957: 186), maximise public 
confidence in government (Wholey, 1993), and maximise the quantum of 
resources available to the private sector (Fellow & Kelaher, 1991; Horton, 
1987). 
MANAGERIALISM AS IIGOOD PUBLIC MANAGEMENT" 
The managerialist belief is that there is a body of sound management 
practices applicable to the private sector that is generic in its scope and thus 
can be directly transferable to the public sector, subject to some cultural 
limits. This belief, espoused by no less a personage than Peter F. Drucker 
(Gazell, 1994), is illusory, because of political control, or at least influence, 
over resources and management processes. 
Managing is the art of doing and public and private sector managers 
practice their arts differently (Lynne, 1984; Mathiasen, 1984; Pritchard, 1992: 
131) largely because of their different external environments, especially their 
different regulatory and accountability regimes (Rainey, 1989). As Parker 
and Subramaniam have observed (1975: 39): 
Examining private and public organisations internally, we may be 
impressed as the management theorist were, by their structural 
resemblances: hierarchies of values and goals; horizontal division 
of labour; “ vertical specialisation" into hierarchies of authority; 
indoctrination of staff with organisational goals and rules; systems 
of coordination and communication; and so on. Looking from 
inside a private organisation outwards, . . . we may be struck by its 
own autonomy, subject to purely monetary balancing of input and 
output, and by its contrast with the confusing mass of 
governmental organisations, their apparent lack of I cost-
consciousness' and their power to interfere with private 
organisations. Looking from inside a government organisation . . 
. we may be aware of its orderly ties with other organisations and 
with its wide horizons, in contrast with the market-oriented 
competition and self centredness of private organisations. 
Organisations in the public and private sectors plan differently, because their 
decision-making, budgeting and accountabi1ity processes differ. They budget 
differently, because their budgeting processes and accountability regimes 
differ. They organise functions differently, because of their budgeting 
processes, regulatory and accountability regimes differ. They manage 
staffing differently, because of their regulatory and accountab i1ity regimes as 
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well as their organisational cultures differ. They do, of course have 
similarities in terms of the tasks they perform (Brianas, 1993; Duncan et al., 
1991). The issue of fundamental importance, however, is the extent to 
which private and public management tasks coincide. Allison (1982: 29) has 
concluded: 
. . public and private managers are at least as different as they are 
similar, and that the differences are more important than the 
similarities. 
The inculcation of managerialist values in public agencies has put 
pressure on civil servants to adopt business management practices 
(Longbottom, 1987), on the grounds that : 
• management problems related to service delivery by public 
agencies are com plex technical ma tters of rela ting to 
productive efficiency, productivity and costs, which are best 
resolved by highly technical experts; 
• centrall y-imposed regulations and externall y-imposed 
political and policy constraints unreasonably restrain expert 
management decision-making; 
• technical abilities and management capacities are the proper 
basis for establishing and maintaining the right to manage 
public service delivery processes, which is a move towards 
the de-politicisation of complex organisational and 
environmental issues tha t would otherwise be resol ved 
within public and political forums; and 
• poli tics and policy, therefore, are proper 1 y red uced to 
constraining, rather than enabling, forces within public 
service delivery agencies; thus, ípso facto 
. the adoption of private sector management practices are the 
solution to "poor management" of public agencies; 
This managerialist perspective has, however, a missing link. Private-sector 
decision-making, with its self-correcting dynamic feedback loops (automatic 
disciplining mechanism), is difficult to replicate in the public sector. First, 
authority in the public sector is much more dispersed, reflecting pressures 
from pluralistic stakeholder constituencies, especially in a representative 
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democracy. Secondly, political decision-makers do not always share 
common goals, objectives and values. Finally, they may have neither the 
required expertise nor the willingness (or ability) to learn from the outcomes 
of past decisions. lndeed, policies and political process are the product of, in 
the words of March and Olsen (1983: 292), "incremental adaption to 
changing problems with available solutions within gradually evolving 
structures of meaning." Thus, as Prasser (1990: 194) remarks "intentions are 
changed, plans become irrelevant, and consistency becomes an impediment 
to the day to day management of issues, crises and problems". 
MANAGERIALIS孔1 AND PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM 
Managerialists seek to shift public agencies from an allegiance to the 
bureaucratic (hierarchy and control) paradigm to an acceptance of a post-
bureaucratic (innovation and support) paradigm (Barzelay, 1992, especially 
ch. 8; Odom et a l., 1990). Where this has been attempted most 
comprehensively (notably in Australia and New Zealand) it has involved 
initiating what Emery and Trist (1965) have described as a "turbulent 
transition" aimed at making public agencies rational instruments for 
achieving shared goals (Gouldner, 1959: 404; Simon, 1976: 257), perhaps with 
a commercial or quasi-commercial twist. Managerialist pressures thus create 
a need for a unique set of organisational changes within public agencies 
agencies that would bring them into a more congruent "strategic fit". This 
means aligning their strategies, culture and leadership style to their 
environment (Chorn, 1991). This requires them to: 
• become more performance oriented, whilst maintaining its 
organisational integrity and protecting its extant professional 
and technical standards; and 
• "manage by antici pa tion" (Chartier, 1985: 177) the 
organisational and behavioural changes needed to achieve 
the desired level of performance . 
To achieve the desired changes a public agency needs to embark on a multi-
facited organisational development process involving: 
• the articulation of an organisational change goal statement 
embracing increased organisational effectiveness at the 
micro-1eve1 (such as, better qua1ity services, greater va1ue for 
money and 10wer costs) and enhanced organisationa1 choice; 
• the specification of the like1y impact (both directiona1 and 
degree) of the changes on the organisation; 
• the deve10pment of an imp1ementation p1an for the 
proposed organisationa1 change, one that is based on a 
wide1y-shared diagnosis of the like1y reactions of those 
responsib1e for imp1ementing the changes, or of those 
affected by the changes (inc1uding those 10cated in the 
Downsian "hinterland", "interior fringe"， μno man' s 1and" 
and "periphery" (Downs, 1967); 
. the imp1ementation of organisationa1 change strategies and 
tactics, invo1ving an entire organisation or a coherent part 
thereof; and 
• the monitoring of the impact and the success of the 
imp1emented organisationa1 change strategies and tactics, so 
as to determine w hether and w hen adjustments to them are 
needed. 
The desired organisational changes are achieved by the use of 
judiciously chosen intervention strategies designed to change the public 
agency's structure, cu1ture and procedures (Blake & Mouton, 1976; Bowers et 
a1., 1975; Dyer, 1981; Rotter & Schlesinger, 1979). 
Structural Change 
The adoption of a performance orientation by a public agency demands 
a review and perhaps a re-casting of its structure - its "management-
prescribed ro1es" (Kahn, 1974: 496) - to ensure that it is aligned with its 
performance goa1s, so ensuring that the requiredμstrategies of contro1" 
(Chi1d, 1972) areb in p1ace to facilitate the efficient and effective conduct of its 
activities. This does not imp1y that hierarchy is the appropriate design 
prescription (Rothschild-Whitt, 1979) in the context of either organisationa1 
comp1exity (Kouzmin, 1980) or efficiency improvement (Marglin, 1971). 
Such restructuring shou1d not be symbolic (Ede1man, 1964), nor shou1d it be 
part of the Downsian 'rigidity cycle', and thus a response to perceived 10ss of 
senior management authority (Downs, 1967: 165-6), nor shou1d it be a means 
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of enhancing control by senior management (Simon et al., 1950). Rather, 
restructuring needs to be seen as a means of de-stabilising protected elites 
and threatening institutional values that are inimical to performance-
oriented success (Selznick, 1957). This may well create a need to have an 
organisational structure which is: 
. vertically flatter, so that problem-solving decisions, especially 
in relation to service de1ivery, can be made at points that are 
closer to the clients (stakeholders), so as to reduce 
performance-sensitive decision response times, to simplify 
co-ordination and to reduce communication distortions; and 
. less forma1ised, to give staff more discretion in satisfying 
idiosyncratic c1ient (stakeholder) needs; and 
• horizontally more complex, even one with a significant 
degree of spatial differentiation, as service providers find an 
advantage in being geographically closer to their clients 
(s takeholders). 
The inherent problem is that these differentiated structures may become 
segmented into tightly closed sub-systems serving self-serving vested 
interests (Jones , 1991). Shareef (1994: 490) argues that sub-system 
congruence, including value congruence, within an organisation is an 
essential ingredient of successful organisational transformation (but see also 
McSwain & White, 1993; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994). 
Cul tural Change 
Organisational culture, at an operational level, comprises three inter-
related dimensions (Marcoulides & Heck, 1993): 
• 
• 
• 
a socio-cultural system of the perceived functioning of an 
organisation's strategies and practices; 
an organisational value system; and 
the collective beliefs of individuals working within the 
organisatíon. 
A public agency's traditional ideals, norms and values must change if it is to 
inculcate a performance-oriented organisational culture that: 
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• supports managerialist values and attitudes, but not so as to 
select out diversity (Sinclair, 1989; Horwitz, 1990) by 
permitting different opinions; 
• encourages and supports behaviours that are performance -
centred; 
• emphasises quality service, adaptability, creativity, initiative, 
cohesion and team work; 
• gives employees leeway to make mistakes, but requires that 
they learn from them; 
• recognises the di versi ty of commi tments and affilia tions tha t 
civil servants have (Philips et a1., 1994), including those: 
• to their clients (stakeholders); 
. to their sense of what constitutes: 
• the "public interest" (Barth, 1992); and 
• appropriate professional standards; and 
• to their employer' s poli tical , burea ucra tic , 
organisational, managerial and financial imperatives 
(Sinclair, 1989 & 1991); and 
• acknowledges that individual behaviours wiU differ 
according and individual beliefs about public service, risk 
preferences, preferred time horizons, attitudes to change 
(whether perceived as an opportunity or as a threat), and 
tolerances of ambiguity and indeterminacy. 
This new culture will have its own symbols, rituals and myths, which gives 
rise to a potential culture conflict in terms of Schein' s (1985) culture 
dimensions of: 
• basic assumptions (those learnt responses that are 
unconsciously held and that determine group perceptions 
and feelings and may even generate less than satisfactory 
"crisis agreements" (Taras, 1991)); 
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• values and beliefs (the essential constituents of an 
individual's conceptual apparatus); and 
• visible artefacts (such as dress codes and office layout 
(Domahidy & Gilsinan, 1992)). 
The existence of a culture conflict reflects the existence of resistance to 
change by those who, when their past is threatened, are frightened of loosing 
whatever it was they valued in the old culture, perhaps even their own 
sense of self-esteem. Culture conflict must be managed (Brown, 1992) by 
those who are sensitive to the symbolic dimensions of their management 
roles (Gunner, 1990) and who are capable of promoting, protecting and 
propagating the new culture-forming values (Sutton & Nelson, 1990). 
Culture conflict must be broken down by reason rather than by coercion 
(Karp, 1988), which requires that the resistance be: 
• brought to the surface (Lundberg, 1990b); 
honoured by being acknow ledged; 
• explored and probed, to distinguish the authentic resistance 
(directed towards specific demands) from the pseudo-
resistance (a product of feelings (such as resentment of 
authority and old grudges) rather than specific demands); 
and 
• negotiated until it reaches a level that is no longer 
d ysfunctiona l. 
Soberingly, Anthony (1990) has observed that management-imposed 
organisational belief systems, values and meanings have rarely been 
transmitted, successfully, to those whose behaviour are targeted for change, 
which has the effect of organisationally isolating managers, who become 
locked into a commitment to values that are not shared and who become 
cocooned within the safety of their contrived organisational world view. 
How to achieve the required culture change is thus the challenge. One 
approach is to adopt a 11 cultural revolution" strategy (Gangliardi, 1986), 
which is designed to develop an organisational socialisation (learning) 
process (Ostroff & Kozlowski, 1992) that would induct all its employees into 
the desired managerialist culture, with the intent of making it dominant. In 
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implementing this cultural revolution, a public agency has to ensure that its 
goals are clearly articulated, so that staff focus is centred on those positive 
dimensions of reform that are compatible with the existing culture (such as 
improving services and creating new career opportunities) rather than the 
negative dimensions (such as cost cutting and the spectre of staff 
redundancies), so as to avoid a debilitating and thus dysfunctional culture 
conflicts (Gregory, 1983), and even a more destructive sub-culture warfare 
(between the new and the old cultures) or perhaps sub-culture elitism 
(associated with the creation of elite groups whose values are perceived to be 
more important that those of the agency as a whole). 
Procedural Dimensions 
Public agencies confront the dilemma of how to develop and 
implement practices and procedures that will make them more business-
like, the essence of which is stakeholder-driven strategic planning, 
implementation and control, which are intended to achieving different 
planning, implementation and control outcomes. These then define a set of 
new tasks to be performed, which, in turn, generates a set of training and 
development needs for those w ho are expected to perform those new tasks. 
The process involved focuses on building the relevant knowledge and skills 
and on developing commitment to reform in those who have to change 
their behaviours. 
MANAGERIALIS孔1 AND PUBLIC MANAGERS 
Public managers confronting managerialist reforms are required to 
manage not only the radical structural, procedural and cultural changes 
involved, but also their resultant anxiety-generating personal change 
implications (Richardson, 1987). In the process they confront the prospect 
that if change and uncertainty are not dealt with appropriately they might 
produce the levels of staff distrust that Culbert and 弘1cDonough (1986) 
consider would becomes an obstacle to the internalisation of new goals, 
values and assumptions. Perhaps more importantly, they may generate to 
the type of fear that Benveniste (1977) considers would engender counter-
productive pathological responses from staff, notably, paranoia, a siege 
mentality, turf protection, back stabbing, dishonesty, sabotage and even 
"organizational gangsterism" (Kobrak, 1992), all of which may give rise to 
some of Caiden's (1991) all-too-numerous identifiable "bureaupathologies" 
(those "vices, maladies and sicknesses of bureaucracy") and may introduce 
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irrationalities, rather than the hoped-for rationalities, into administrative 
processes. If left uncorrected these pathological responses may become 
institutionalised and begin to inhibit the organisation' s capacity and 
willingness to learn from its environment, giving rise to serious public 
and/or political complaints about incompetence (Ott & Shafritz, 1994) and so 
threaten the capacity of the organisation to adapt or even to survive, by 
adversely impacting on vertical management credibility, change motivation 
and functional unit co-operation (Gabris &孔1itchell， 1991). Perceptions of 
public managers' adroitness becomes related to the adequacy of their agency' s 
perceptions about the need for change (and the nature of required change 
processes); and to their capacity to sift out and process reliable information, 
to plan, deliver and evaluate change, and to manage the conflicting 
demands generated by change. 
The inculcation of managerialist values and practices is achieved by 
rewarding public managers who are more adaptive in the face of transitional 
opportunities (Bechkard & Harris, 1977; Kimberly & Quinn, 1984; Nadler, 
1982), by giving them more resources, from both budgetal and extra-budgetal 
sources, and more authority, through greater decision-making autonomy 
(Meier, 1980 & 1987). This, in turn, encourages them, and their staff, to 
concentrate on affective, cognitive, and even motor learning, the outcome 
of which is change (Knowles, 1973: 6-11); the acceptance and adoption of new 
insights, outlooks, expectations, thought processes (Smith, 1983: “) and 
behaviours (and habits) (Bunning, 1992; Crow & Crow, 1963) which, in turn, 
legitimate and facilitate change by devaluing commitment to past practices 
and to conformity. In this environment, managers need to be able to: 
• process and evaluate strategic information under conditions 
of uncertainty; 
• design and put in place new structures that address the 
structurally contingent problems of change by facilitating and 
directing information flows into patterns of cognition, 
communication and analysis (Scharpf, 1977) and that kindle 
those internal thought processes in others that lead to 
attitudinal and/or behavioural change, so as to reduce 
commitment to past practices and to facilitate innovation 
(Grady, 1992); and 
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• become more adaptive to the transitional opportunities and 
constraints, whether by strategic choice or a reactive response 
to changes in the environment, or both (Astley & Van de 
Ven, 1983; Hrebiniak & Joyce, 1985). 
It is, thus, an environment that encourages and rewards managers who are 
transformational leaders, defined by Burns (1978: 20) 的 leaders w ho engage 
. . . with others in such a way that leaders and followers raise one 
another to higher levels of motivation and morality. . . . Their 
purpose which might have started out as separate but related so 
becomes fused . . . as mutual support for common purpose. 
They can be characterised as leaders capable of "idealised influence", 
"inspirational motivation", "intellectual stimulation" and 代individualised 
consideration" (Bass & Avolio, 1994). Managers are encouraged in this 
environment to give charismatic leadership (Conger, 1989; Conger & 
Kanungo, 1987, 1988, 1992 & 1994). This is a style of leadership that causes 
others to see and pursue a different direction than they would otherwise 
pursue, thus converting them to followers , by creating common purpose, 
through visionary direction-setting; by building new organisational 
relationships; by being able to manage ambiguity; and by becoming cultural 
architects, so producing organisational change through the unfreezing of the 
existing culture and its realigning to the new vision, and so begin the 
necessary dynamic process of shifting its shared assumptions, values and 
norms (as described by Goldberg, 1985)). In such an environment 
operational leadership (Fiedler & Chemers, 1974) that is planning oriented 
and designed to produce orderly results is relegated to the realm of middle 
management (also Barker, 1989). 
On Achieving Individual Behaviour Change 
There are a myriad of motivational forces that drive individuals 
towards the practice of the new behaviours: 
need: hierarchy of needs theory, as argued by Maslow (1970); 
motivation-hygiene theory, as argued by Herzberg, Mausner 
and Snyderman (1959) and Herzberg (1966); achievement-
power-affiliation theory, as argued by McClelland (1961); and 
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existence-relatedness-growth theory, as argued by Alderfer 
(1972); 
• goal setting: specificity of goals theory, as argued by Locke 
(1968) and by Locke and Latham (1990)); 
• expected attractiveness of outcome: expectancy theory as 
argued by Vroom (1964) ; and 
• social comparisons: equity theory, as argued by Adams 
(1965)). 
Which (if any) of these motivational forces are effective can depend on the 
individuals': 
• attitudes and values, notably their capacity and willingness to 
build the motivation they need to adopt new behaviours; 
and 
• personal characteristics, notably their capacity and 
willingness to be critically observant of their own behaviours 
and motivators and so develop the capacity to manage their 
own behaviour change. 
To change behaviour requires a variety of organisational strategies, 
premised on the proposition that individuals in the process of adopting a 
new behaviour experiences learning (Atkinson et a1., 1988) that can be the 
result of: 
• observations made of the new behaviour as practiced by 
another person, and its subsequent imitation by the learner 
(sociallearning theory, as argued by Bandura (1986)); or 
• feedback received by the learner about the success or failure 
attendant upon the new behavioural being practiced 
(positive and negative reinforcements theory, as argued by 
Skinner (1969). 
The practice of learnt desirable new behaviour in the workplace can thus be 
encouraged by means of: 
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• role modelling, involving the use of "model" staff practicing 
the desirable behaviours for other rnanagers to observe, 
recall, rehearse and irnitate (Manz & Sirns, 1981); and/or 
• instrumental conditioning, involving the consistent 
application of contingencies of reinforcernent (Frederiksen, 
1982; Kerr, 1975; Kornaki et al., 1989; Luthans & Kreitner, 
1982; Miller, 1978): 
• "positive reinforcernent" (providing a rewarding or 
sa tisfying consequence following the perforrnance of the 
desired behaviour, which further encourages that 
behaviour); 
• "negative reinforcernent" (stopping a dissatisfying 
consequence following the perforrnance of a desired 
behaviour, which further encourages that behaviour);、
“ extinction" (stopping a satisfying consequence frorn 
following the perforrnance of an undesired behaviour, 
which discourages that behaviour); and/or 
• "punishment" (by providing an unsa tisfying 
consequence following the performance of the 
undesired behaviour, which further discourages that 
behaviour) 
How , and even whether, the continued practice of undesirable 
behaviour should be "punished" is open to sorne question (Arvey & 
Ivancevich, 1980; Arvey & Jones, 1985; Beyer & Trice, 1984; Katz & Kahn, 
1978; Lussier, 1990; Miner & Brewer, 1976; O'Reilly &叭Teitz， 1980; Podsakoff, 
1982), for while the undesired behaviour rnay be temporarily suppress or ar 
least weakened by "punishment", it could well have undesirable secondary 
effects. The recalcitrant staff, rnay in the face of "punishment", resort to 
counter-productive defensive behaviours (like the denial of personal 
shortcornings or the blarning of others) or aggressive behaviours (like hate, 
hostility and deviousness). They rnost likely become de-rnotivated, perhaps 
because of their confusion over their slighted dignity, caused when their job 
cornmitment is questioned, or because of their anger and frustration, caused 
when they cannot dealt with that confusion Their sub-conscious hope is 
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that change will not be necessary for them, which is when they begin to 
b1ame others for their plight. Disillusionment follows, which is when they 
communicate their unhappiness with others. Then comes unco-
operativeness, which is when they begin criticising their organisation. 
U1timate1y, they become non-functiona1 members of the organisation, 
which is when they become alienated and cynica1 in their behaviour. They 
may become focussed on what Homer and Levine (1985: 241) describe as 
"triviocracy" name1y: 
. continua1 intense combat over issues which seem to outside 
observer to be unimportant to both the organiza tion and its 
members while the major prob1ems and opportunities 
confronting the organisation go unattended. 
Such a preoccupation, they (1985: 249) argue: 
. . produces alienation from colleaguesand work, and produces a 
host of collective bads from 10w mora1e to 10w productivity. The 
individua1 is a1ways on the defensive: forced to fight for one's 
dignity, ever fearfu1 with no permanent gains made. 
A person's behaviour change can be predicted from their attitude 
towards that change (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). Vroon's expectancy theory 
(Vroon, 1964) indicates that an individua1 compares possib1e future 
outcomes of various behavioura1 alternatives and then chooses the 
behaviour that is most attractive in terms of outcomes (孔1itchell， 1974). 
Individua1s who believes that a particu1ar behaviour (or task) will 1ead 
mostly to positive outcomes for them will ho1d a favourab1e attitude 
towards that behaviour. On the other hand, if they cannot anticipate that 
that behaviour will 1ead to positive outcomes for them, or even worse, if 
they anticipate that it will 1ead to negative outcomes, such as incongruence 
with established individua1 or group norms, job insecurity, 10ss of self-
esteem, se1f-confidence , reward , contro1, power , competence or 
re1ationships, then their attitudes to it will be negative and resistance to 
change may emerge (Beer, 1980; Calish & Gamache, 1981; Connor & 
Patterson, 1982; Hu1tman, 1979; Karp, 1984; Mann & Neff, 1961; Zander, 1961; 
but see a1so Nord & Jermier, 1994). Thus imposing behaviours (ways of 
doing tasks) on individua1s by edict will not, ípso facto , generate a positive 
attitude towards them, which means that they may perform the new tasks in 
a perfunctory way until the externa1 constraints are removed, which then 
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allows them to revert to old behaviours that are consistent with their 
attitudes. The implication of this is that achieving lasting behaviour change 
requires that those whose behaviours are expected to change must be able to: 
• perceive the internal or external pressure on the 
organisation to adopt the required changes in the medium-
to-long-term (Greiner, 1969); 
• perceive support for those changes from those at the highest 
echelons of the organisation (Blake & Mouton, 1964; Dalton 
et a1., 1970), who have demonstrated a willingness to commit 
the necessary resources to achieve change; 
• perceive a congruence between the new behaviours and the 
organisation's shared values, beliefs and norms that 
determine what is expected and what is rewarded in the 
organisation (孔1argulies & Raia, 1978); 
• be involved in the organisa tional change process (Beer & 
Davis, 1976; Coch & French, 1948; but see also Shareef, 1994: 
511); 
• see that other members of their organisational unit, 
constituting a critical mass or dominant coalition, are 
adopting the new behaviours (Beer, 1980; Beckhard & Harris, 
1977; Goodman el a1., 1980; Margulies & Raia, 1978), so 
evidencing that the new behaviours have become congruent 
with group beliefs and values (Feldman, 1983; Feldman & 
Arnold, 1984; Kiesler & Kiesler, 1971); 
• share the beHef with other group members that positive or 
negative sanctions will follow performance or non-
performance of the new behaviours (Katz & Kahn, 1978), 
including sanctions derived from the level of cohesiveness, 
the existence of formal authority structures and the reward 
systems within the group (Beer, 1980); 
• receive continued feedback and information regarding the 
behaviour changes (Beckhard & Harris, 1977); and 
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• perceive that both the formal policies and systems and the 
organisational culture are consistent with, and supportive of, 
the changes and innovation (Huse, 1975; Shih, 1993a & 
1993b; Zimbardo et a1., 1990). 
On Managing Organisational Change 
An effective organisational change process requires leadership that not 
only has the desire to initiate change but also the authority to do so (Lloyd, 
1993). It also requires leaders who behave as Bellavista's (1989-90) "heros" 
(who, being dissatisfied . with the status quo and being willing to challenge 
it, plan and execute change, after winning allies and vanquishing enemies) 
and who have the ability to to create Gilbert and Kleiner's (1993) "change 
lovers", other individuals who have a commitment to change, who are 
willing to take control of the change process, who accept change as a 
challenge, and who are able to connect the diverse elements of the change 
process. This style of leadership is crucially important in the organisational 
change process as a means of coping with the almost inevitable barriers to 
change, namel y the lack of belief by some in the appropriateness of change 
and the resistance by others to that change, perhaps in fear of their own 
possible failure. 
The successful implementation of managerialist reform thus requires 
leadership that is capable of: 
re-defining organisational primary purpose and core beliefs 
(Covey & Gulledge, 1992); 
• creating a vision (Buhler, 1993) of how the post-reform 
future will look in terms of organisational structure, culture 
and performance standard; 
• defining the required strategic objectives within a medium-
to-long-term perspective; 
• planning and resourcing adequately the necessary structural 
and procedural changes; and 
• empowering those expected to assume group leadership 
posìtions. 
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CONCLUSION 
Managerialist reform may improve the performance of public agencies, 
but 0叫Y if a wide variety of challenges and threa ts confronting public 
agencies can be addressed 
• at the the service delivery unit level, these include how to 
inculcate a performance-oriented culture and to encourage 
the wide-spread adoption of business practices and 
management techniques; 
• at the agency level, these include how to address the issues 
surrounding the change of organisational culture (including 
culture differen tia tion and even conflict), s tructure , 
procedures and accountability; 
• at the central agency level, these include how to address the 
issues associated with resource and policy coordination, 
control and accountability; and 
• at the the politico-administrative system level these include 
how to address the issues of political, organisational and 
management accountability, ethics and values). 
In essence, managerialists expect public managers to improve 
organisational efficiency, so as to reduce costs, while at the same time 
enhance organisational performance by meeting the often competing needs 
of a variety of stakeholders, within politico-administrative environment 
that punishes mistakes and rewards risk averse behaviour, regardless of the 
costs and effort involved in avoiding unacceptable or intolerable outcome 
flowing from administrative decisions. The real challenge is thus to change 
this culture of risk aversion at all levels, so as to permit organisational and 
management innovation to take place. 
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